Week 1 - High Antiquity and the Rise of the Qin

 

59m-61b. When King Wu assumes the throne, there is no description of his great virtue, which contrasts with the introduction of previous kings such as Shun (12t) and Yao (6t). Would not the resumption of that pattern be more persuasive? Instead, the introduction of Wu centers on how he rallies his troops and uses his might – not his virtue – to overthrow Emperor Zhou. Given that another ruler, Emperor Jie, damaged society by “engag[ing in] military power… not virtuous government,” we may suspect a similar fate for King Wu (38t). Yet the passage may suggest that a sharp distinction between virtue and military might is inappropriate. When Wu approached the capital, the tyrant’s men desired Wu’s success and turned their weapons against their own leader (61m). This episode echoes a previous pattern in the text wherein the feudal lords rally around the worthiest ruler (11t, 16b, 36t), thereby constituting that ruler’s military might. In Wu’s case, the soldiers’ preference may not be based on their perception of Wu’s virtue as much as their disapproval of Zhou’s cruelty – though, to be precise, their reason is not given – but the result (the conferral of might upon the more virtuous ruler) is the same. Perhaps this suggests that the ability to subdue others by the sword proceeds directly from the virtuous self- ordering of the leader. Thus, violence can be a tool by which the virtuous leader creates human flourishing. This hypothesis raises the question of how the text would account for the possibility of tyranny, the conferral of might upon he who is not virtuous, which we see with Zhou. Does the suggestion of might as a consequence of virtue not presuppose that the ruler’s virtue must be evident to the lords? Does it not also presuppose feudal lords capable of discerning which leader is worth following and which is not? To value a leader’s virtue implies that the feudal lords must be to some degree sympathetic to virtue. Also, why does King Wu’s engagement in military strength not conflict with his engagement in virtuous government, as it does with Emperor Jie? Further investigation of how virtue is cultivated, perceived by others, and perhaps conferred to others would be a fruitful direction for further inquiry into the relationship of military might and virtue.

Q 15b-17t. Is You Yu correct in his assertion that music, rites, laws and regulations are the cause of the chaos in Qin? Examining Shun’s assertion from 34m that if he hears its music he can “observe whether [the country is] in order or disorder,” the reader is led to conclude that the ordered music of a country is indicative of its ordered moral character. If we take this interpretation of music as authoritative, then we must conclude that Duke Mu’s state is in disorder, given that the “music of China” that he sends is a corrupting force upon the Rong ruler. The music proves injurious to the ruler, which seems to prove You Yu correct in his opinion of China’s music, rites, etc. But then why would he ultimately change his allegiance? You Yu points out that the rites, music, etc. were created by the sage rulers who took the lead in carrying them out, implying that perhaps the rites themselves are not as problematic as the kings who no longer adhere to them. In other words, the rites proceeded from the internal ordering of the sage kings. Likewise, he relates that “the governing of the whole [Rong] state is like the ordering of a single individual,” but unlike the sage kings no external constraints (such as laws) proceed from this ordering. Perhaps You Yu changes sides because he sees that even though the internal, uncodified ordering of the Rong society is ideal, the fact that it can be so easily corrupted by an outside influence* reinforces the need for external organizational forces such as laws and rites. The Qin, then, may not be able to attain the same level of moral flourishing as that of high antiquity or even that of the Rong people, but their longevity at least provides evidence that a favorable attitude towards the rites, music, laws, and regulations handed down to them might help a society maintain stability over time. Sima Qian states that the Qin rulers, while not wicked, are not morally exemplary, which may illustrate a critical benefit of the external constraints: the success of the state does not strictly depend on the moral character of one man (86m). Of course, the adherence to external norms does not completely explain the success of the Qin as other Sinicized tribes and states also received these from antiquity. But further inquiry into the nature of these four components in the text would be worthwhile.

*The further conundrum of how music can simultaneously serve as a stabilizing (for Qin) and corrupting (for the Rong) force should also be given further consideration.

- Lauren Delucchi, 9/3/23