Week Five Metzger

 

[H169b] Why does Han Xin (HX) order his troops to “draw up their ranks with their backs to the river” (169b, 2^nd full para., last sentence)? We first catch a glimpse of this strategy from a “general order throughout the camp” (169t, 1^st full para., 5th sentence): when the Zhao forces leave their fortification to pursue HX, some of HX’s forces should enter the Han fortification and replace Zhao banners with their own (ibid, sentences 7 & 8). HX’s generals pretend to agree with this plan (169m). So, I can only imagine what their question should/might have been: are the Zhao forces “sure [my emphasis] to abandon their fortifications” (ibid)? In HX’s next direct address regarding his plan (this time speaking to his officers), HX acknowledges that the Zhao will be reluctant to leave their fortifications, so the Zhao must see the commanding general’s banners and hear his drums in the gorge else--the Zhao will imagine--HX “will see the difficulty of the position and retreat back up the gorge” (169m, 2^nd full para.). But that’s not all I suspect the Zhao must see:  they must see that HX has positioned his forces with their backs to river. Why? We’re told that the Zhao forces roar with laughter when they see this positioning (169b, 2^nd full para., last sent.). Later, after HX’s plan is successful, we learn one possible source for the Zhao’s laughter. The Art of War, HX’s generals say, tells us to position troops so they do not assume that disadvantageous position (backs against the water, ibid).  But, as HX explains, that’s precisely the position in which HX believes it efficacious to position his tired and untrained troops because they will then fight as if their lives depended on their success (170b-171t); this strategy, too—HX says--is in the Art of War (170b). This interchange marks one of the few, if not the only, instances in our readings where we have explicitly seen how studying the same book leads to success for some and failure for others. Before the battle’s end, “backs against the water” appeared to be a beginner’s mistake in strategy (a source of encouragement to the enemy); after the battle, it’s more a source of wonderment for HX’s generals. If there is a lesson, here, about how to read SQ, the lesson might be for us to respect the difference between those who live by the book and those who learn from it.

[H271tm] Did Chen Ping (CP) and Zou Bo (ZB) know better than Wang Ling (WL) how to assure the Liu family’s continuance (ibid)?  If their support of dowager empress’ (DE) proposal to make kings of her family members (271t, 2^nd full para.) could be linked to some political exigency that endangered the Liu family’s imperial position, then CP and ZB’s support could be understood as something more than flattery.  The death of Emperor Hui the Filial is a candidate for such a political exigency. SQ tells us of Emperor Hui’s death (270m, 2^nd full para.) right before the scene where DE checks her ministers’ minds regarding her proposal (271t). SQ presents this information as a “riddle” posed by a young page to CP:  the DE’s only son has died without any grown sons yet she does not mourn (270m, 4^th full para.). Answering his own riddle, the page suggests that ED is afraid of CP and others, so members of her family should be appointed to garrisons guarding the capital, presumably near enough to protect her (270m, 6^th para.). Using our imaginations, we might be able to see another, more political fear. Acting as DE might herself, the ministers could find a young heir to put in the emperor’s position, then “advise” and wield power (bolstered by an alliance with a powerful family) in that young emperor’s name. But this political scenario is not a threat to the Liu family unless the “white horse” agreement is broken (“if anyone not of the Liu family becomes a king, the empire shall unite in attacking him” 271t). What DE proposes to WL, CP, and ZB still seems to be the real threat to the Liu family! Could CP and ZB have used the empress’ pro-Lü inclination and the Lü family’s influence to maintain stability by postponing the political unrest that arises when there is succession question? SQ’s curious summation of ED and her son’s rule (“the world was at peace” 284b) might support such a notion. And SQ does take us into a secret meeting, after ED’s death, where “high officials” plot regarding the next emperor (282m, 1^st full para.). That they do not want “the Lü family all over again.” nor an emperor who is “too young” are key values in this discussion (282m, 2^nd full para.).  Would this attitude toward the Lü family and young emperors have emerged so strongly without CP and ZB’s initial “flattery” and ED’s fear?