Metzger Week Six

 

[H421b-422t]. At the end of the Grand Historian’s remarks on Liu Pi (LP), SQ insinuates that LP’s career is a cautionary tale regarding feudal management (ibid). If one does not follow conventional wisdom in this regard, LP is the result. Conventional wisdom embraces the following tenets. First, the size of feudal territories should be limited in size (421b-422t). Second, feudal lords should not capitalize on the “resources of hill and sea” (422t, ll. 1-2). Third, the relations between the feudal lords and barbarians should not become so friendly that the feudal lords “thrust aside” their own kin (422t, ll. 2-3). Proper feudal management may limit the resources and alliances upon which a feudal state might call in order to rebel, and improper feudal management may set the scene for or make a successful rebellion possible. But feudal management does not identify rebellion’s flashpoint. Does SQ help us to identify that flashpoint? There are some candidates in “SJ106,” but I’m not certain SQ would agree that identifying the flashpoint should attract my interest. The flashpoint could be the moment LP has allies, other kingdoms who identify themselves with Wu’s plight (we’re losing territory, 407t). The flashpoint could be when the rebels finally deployed their armies and executed Han officials in their territories (409m, 410t).  And I’m sure there are other flashpoint candidates for which one could advocate. But, again, is that the point that SQ is sharing? I suspect SQ’s point is more what we find in HII 204t:  there’s a way to reduce the effectiveness of a single lord hell-bent on rebellion (e.g., LP) as well as ameliorate the conditions (feudal resources/excesses) likely to foment rebellion. The advisors (Yuang Ang [YA] and Chao Cuo [CC]) just didn’t think of it. YA and CC’s advice (kill him [414t], take that [407t]) still places agent against agent, both bound to a shared circumstance; HII204t (a change in inheritance law) allows the feudal lords to change the circumstances (the resources that they might commit toward a rebellion) by pursuing an agent-specific good (an extension of “blessings”) that effects a good for the empire (“the feudal lords will be gradually weakened” 204t).   

 

[SJ130, p. 6, 3^rd para.]. SQ claims that not understanding the principles of Spring and Autumn (SA) will have the following results:  kings/fathers will bring upon themselves evildoers (I’m assuming ministers/sons who will harm them) while ministers/sons will “surely fall into the sin of rebellion or regicide” (3rd para. ll. 15-19). SQ also claims that all of these misfortunes come from thinking they (these moral agents) know the good but not understanding its principles (ll. 18-19). Kings/fathers and ministers/sons might do what they think is good and even be able to articulate the good that justifies their actions, yet, in hindsight prompted by failure, they realize the good they were pursuing is wrong. In this case, understanding the principles of the good might mean that one has learned to frame one’s actions by something other than one’s intent or that’s actions immediate result. But this kind of thinking is only prompted once one has hit rock bottom or perceived oneself to be hoisted by one’s own petard. Wouldn’t “understanding the principles of the good” require something more? SQ seems to suggest as much, at least in terms of SA, when he writes that SA differentiates between “right and wrong” (para. 2, l. 7).  If SA is a help to those who wish to understand the principles of the good and SA differentiates between “right and wrong,” then I could relate these two activities as follows: understanding the principles of the good would entail the performance and identification of an action as either good or wrong for any given action (even those that are unexpected). Then, my reflection on the good of an action would not be confined to moments of hindsight. Understanding the principles of the good would mean that I understand how the good comes to be; I could then predict as well as describe “right and wrong.” I grant that “predict” may be the wrong word to associate with history. I certainly do not mean to suggest that SQ believes that human beings are trapped by their immediate circumstances. Rather, if SQ is writing a history that, like SA, requires reflection and helps me to understand principles, it will help me to account for (“exercise independent judgment,” l. 15) regarding what is unexpected (what SQ calls an “emergency,” l. 14).